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INTRODUCTION
The district court’s determination that A.R.S. § 15-112(A)(3) is facially
overbroad (ER1at 20) depends upon its premise that students have “an established
right to receive information and ideas in the classroom” (ER1 at 15). This Court
should reverse the district court’s decision that section 15-112(A)(3) is facially
overbroad in violation of the First Amendment because the district court’s premise
and its conclusion are both incorrect. The contours of a student’s First
Amendment right to receive information are uncertain, ill-defined, and—most
importantly—subject to the State’s broad and plenary authority over curricular
matters. Moreover, any right that a student has to receive information is not
implicated by this subsection of the statute, which does not prohibit all ethnic
studies classes, but only prohibits those that are “designed primarily for pupils of a
particular ethnic group.” A.R.S. § 15-112(A)(3). Subsection 15-112(A)(3) is not
overbroad either. When read in connection with the statute’s remaining provisions,
including the Declaration of Policy, it complements those provisions by assuring
that the State’s goal of reducing racism in schools is met by preventing districts
from implementing curriculum that balkanizes schools.
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ARGUMENT
I.

Arizona Revised Statutes § 15-112(A)(3) Does Not Implicate Any First
Amendment Right of a Student to Receive Information.
The district court relied on Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 861

(1982) and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) as
support for its premise “that limits on curriculum should be upheld as long as they
reasonably relate to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” (ER1 at 16.) Neither, in
fact, addresses limits on the State’s power to set curriculum, and neither is
sufficient support for that proposition. Pico addressed the removal of books from a
school library. And while it began with a reminder that the Supreme Court’s
“precedents have long recognized certain constitutional limits upon the power of
the State to control even the curriculum and classroom,” 457 U.S. at 861, it also
emphasized that “the current action does not require us to re-enter this difficult
terrain,” and that “[r]espondents do not seek . . . to impose limitations on their
school Board’s discretion to prescribe the curricula” (id., at 862). It further
emphasized that “public education in our Nation is committed to the control of
state and local authorities” and that “there is a legitimate and substantial
community interest in promoting respect for authority and traditional values be
they social, moral, or political.” Id. at 864 (internal quotation marks omitted).
While the district court paid lip service to these principles and even recognized that
any curricular restrictions would be subject to only limited scrutiny, it in fact failed
2
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to accord sufficient respect to state and local authorities’ ability to “defend [their]
claim of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum.” 1 (ER1 at 11-12, 15)
(quotation marks omitted).
The Arce Plaintiffs failed to address Hazelwood in their Response and
Reply, perhaps because this decision, although relied upon by the district court,
does not address a student’s right to receive information. Rather, it involves school
officials’ control of student speech in a school-sponsored newspaper, allowing
such control as long as it is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.” Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. Importantly, the Hazelwood Court stated
further that “[i]t is only when the decision to censor a school-sponsored . . . vehicle
of student expression has no valid educational purpose that the First Amendment is
so directly and sharply implicate[d] as to require judicial intervention to protect
students’ constitutional rights.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Here, of course, the State is not censoring student expression; it is
instead carrying out its constitutionally mandated responsibility to educate
Arizona’s youth.
The district court also cites Johnson v. Stuart, 702 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1983),
and Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School District, 158 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 1998),
1

As the State pointed out in Appellees’ Principal and Response Brief, not only
does it possess substantial authority over curriculum, but Arizona’s Constitution
obligates it to educate the state’s youth. (Doc. 44 at 23-24)
3
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to support its conclusion regarding a student’s purported First Amendment right to
receive information. Neither justifies that conclusion. Johnson assumed without
analysis that a student has a right to receive information. 702 F.2d at 195.
Monteiro involved a parent’s effort to have Huck Finn removed from the
classroom based on the on the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause;
the Ninth Circuit wisely rejected that effort because other students’ “First
Amendment rights are infringed when books that have been determined by the
school district to have legitimate educational value are removed from a mandatory
reading list because of threats of damages, lawsuits, or other forms of retaliation.”
158 F.3d at 1029.
While as the district court noted, Monteiro does rely on Pico in recognizing
that students have some kind of First Amendment right to receive information, id.
at 1027 n.5, it also notes that such a claim would “significantly interfere with the
District’s discretion to determine the composition of its curriculum.” Id. at 1029.
Here, the State stands in a stronger position than did the school district in
Monteiro, because it is constitutionally obligated to educate its youth. See supra,
n.1. Thus, this Court should, as it did in Monteiro, respect the educational
determination that the State has made. Id. (deferring to school board’s
determination regarding students’ education).

4
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The Arce Plaintiffs commit the same error as the district court and
compound it by erecting straw men, suggesting that the State is somehow arguing
that its plenary authority over curriculum would allow it to remove materials from
schools for any reason or even for a bad reason. (Doc. 52 at 34.) They give too
little weight to the State’s acknowledgement that the Constitution plays a role in
limiting a State’s discretion over curriculum (Doc. 44 at 25) while at the same time
insisting that the State removed material from Tucson Unified School District’s
classrooms and that it seeks to justify its right to do so here and in the future. But,
as the State made clear both below and in its Principal and Response Brief, the
Arce Plaintiffs’ argument that the State removed books from TUSD or required
elimination of the Mexican American Studies program is entirely unsupported by
any evidence. (Doc. 44 at 21-22.) Instead of pointing to evidence that
demonstrates that the State removed books or eliminated the program, the Arce
Plaintiffs recycle their tired and misleading argument that the State’s actions
“caused” the removal of books or had the effect of removing the program. (Doc.
52 at 32-33.) The Arce Plaintiffs’ failure to controvert the State’s evidence that
TUSD, a nonparty, removed the books and shut down the program is a tacit
concession as to the truth of the State’s position.

5
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Arizona Revised Statutes § 15-112(A)(3) Is Not Overbroad.
The Arce Plaintiffs and the district court’s conclusion that A.R.S. § 15-

112(A)(3) is overbroad suffers from the same deficiency as does their analysis of a
student’s right to receive information. In neither analysis do they sufficiently
credit the State’s responsibility and obligation over public school curricula.
Subsection 15-112(A)(3) represents the State’s legitimate concern that courses and
classes not be designed to promote the balkanization of schools. The desire to
ensure that curricula does not promote segregation of ethnic groups is a separate,
complementary purpose that helps carry out the statute’s stated goal of ensuring
that “public school pupils [are] taught to treat and value each other as individuals.”
A.R.S. § 15-111. As such, it is a legitimate exercise of the State’s plenary
authority over curriculum, and the district court should not have struck it down.

6
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court should reverse the district court’s
decision striking down subsection A.R.S. § 15-112 (A)(3).
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of July, 2014.

Thomas C. Horne
Attorney General

s/Leslie Kyman Cooper
Leslie Kyman Cooper
Jinju Park
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for DefendantsAppellees/Cross-Appellants, Arizona
Superintendent of Public Instruction
and the Arizona State Board of
Education
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 32(a)
This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(7)(B) because it contains 1,302 words, excluding the parts of the brief that
Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii) exempts.
Dated this 21st day of July, 2014.

s/Leslie Kyman Cooper
Leslie Kyman Cooper
Assistant Attorney General
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